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1. Introduction 
 
The determinants of foreign direct investment (FDI) have received lots of 
attention in the empirical literature.
1 A number of studies show that host country 
governance characteristics, such as poor protection of property rights and corruption can 
negatively affect FDI by increasing the threats of expropriation and the costs of doing 
business (Lee and Mansfield (1996), Li and Resnick (2003), Wei (2000a and 2000b)). 
However, the empirical literature has paid little attention to the differential impact of host 
country governance characteristics on foreign investors of various sizes. This issue is 
policy relevant given the importance that policymakers attach to the role and 
internationalization of small and medium size businesses (SME) and the crucial role they 
play in fostering innovation (Acs et al. (1996), Beck et al. (2005), UNCTAD (1998)).  
There are reasons to believe that smaller foreign investors can be more sensitive 
to host country’s institutional quality than larger investors. Svensen (2003) found that the 
bargaining power of the foreign investors matters for their investment decisions. Larger 
foreign investors are more likely to have bargaining power, make more credible threats of 
retaliation to foreign governments if their property rights are violated, and can afford 
lawyers and bribes due to more resources, contacts and clout (Acs et al, 1996). Moreover, 
as Acs et al. (1996) argue, since innovation is largely due to smaller firms, they need 
better protection of property rights.
2 Finally, poor institutions increase risk and 
uncertainty. As Ghosal and Loungani (2000) show, smaller firms are more sensitive to 
heightened uncertainty and risk.  
We test the hypothesis that a smaller firm’s FDI is more sensitive to host 
country’s governance characteristics than a larger firm’s FDI using detailed firm level 
data on European investments. Various property rights and corruption indices are used as 
proxies for the quality of governance in host countries. We find that poor governance in 
host countries has a larger deterrent effect on smaller foreign investors. 
                                                 
1 See Blonigen (2005) for a survey of the literature. 
2 According to Acs and Audretsch (1988), the correlation of patents with the rate of product and production 
innovation is higher for smaller firms than larger firms. According to UNCTAD (1993) report, 
transnational SMEs conduct more R&D and produce more patented goods compared to domestic SMEs.    3
  The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the model. Section 3 
describes the data and the variables. Section 4 discusses the results. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2.  The Model  
 
We estimate the following fixed effect logit model  
FDIic =1 if FDI
*
ic >0 




ic=di+β1Xc+ β2Governancec+ β3Governancec *Sizei+uic   (1) 
 
where the dependent variable takes on the value of one if firm i has invested in country c 
and zero otherwise. For each firm the number of observations is equal to the number of 
possible destination countries in the sample. To control for unobserved firm 
characteristics, firm-specific dummy variables (di) are employed. On the right hand side 
we include controls for host country characteristics (Xc), and an interaction term between 
a proxy for the destination country’s quality of governance and parent firm’s size, 
measured by the logarithm of firm’s total assets. 
 
3. Data Description 
The data come from the commercial database Amadeus. We focus on the largest 
10,000 firms operating in Europe (the size measured by the value of total assets in 1999) 
and their subsidiaries in twenty-three Western and Eastern European countries during 
1998-2001.
3 
A data set on new subsidiaries is constructed by comparing the subsidiary listings 
for companies included in both the 1998 and 2001 versions of the Amadeus database.  
The ownership information pertains mostly to year 2000 and 1999.  
                                                 
3 We focus only on European subsidiaries, as they represent almost 90% of the new subsidiaries. The 
following countries are included: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Switzerland, Czech Rep., Denmark, 
Germany, Spain, Finland, France, UK, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, 
Portugal, Sweden, Slovakia, Turkey, Ukraine.    4
We use several governance measures. The Property_Rights index comes from the 
Global Competitiveness Report 2001-2002 (World Economic Forum). It is based on an 
extensive survey of managers and intends to capture the possibility of expropriation of 
assets, insecurity of property rights and contracts. A higher score implies better protection 
of property rights. 
Next, we use the governance measure derived by Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-
Lobaton (1999), henceforth Governance_KKZ. Higher values imply better governance. 
The Governance_KKZ index is a more sophisticated and improved version of the popular 
Transparency International Corruption index.  
Following Smarzynska and Wei (2004), we also use the composite corruption 
measure, called GCR_WDR, based on data from the Global Competitiveness Report 
(GCR) 1997 and from the World Development Report
 (WDR) surveys. Higher numbers 
mean more corruption.  
The final measure - German_Exporter Index is based on the information obtained 
by Neumann (1994) from German exporters. The measure indicates the proportion of the 
transactions that involved corrupt payments.
4 A higher value means more corruption.  
Turning to other host country specific characteristics, we control for factors 
commonly mentioned in the literature as determinants of FDI.  Population size is used as 
a proxy for market size. We expect that larger markets will attract more foreign investors. 
We use the FDI_Restrictions Index derived by Wei (2000). The index focuses on areas 
such as foreign exchange controls, exclusion of foreign firms from strategic sectors, and 
restrictions on the share of foreign ownership. A higher value implies more restrictions.  
Corporate taxation in the host country is another factor that can affect FDI (Hines, 1996, 
Devereux and Griffith, 1998). We employ the corporate tax rates as reported by KPMG 
(2000). If several rates apply, the highest one is used. Finally, we add a dummy variable 
for transition countries to control for other differences between industrialized and 
transition economies that may not be captured by the explanatory variables. 
The summary statistics are presented in Tables 1. 
 
                                                 
4 Neumann’s index was also used by Ades and Di Tella (1997).   5
4. Estimation results 
The estimation results are reported in Table 2. The first 4 columns report the 
regression results for various governance indices used (without the interaction term). The 
rest of the columns include the interaction term. Since information on FDI_Restrictions is 
missing for some countries, in the last four columns we drop the FDI_Restrictions index 
to add more observations.  
The size of host country’s population positively affects FDI – a larger population 
implies a larger market, making FDI more attractive. Host country FDI_Restrictions have 
a negative effect on FDI. A higher corporate tax rate makes the country less attractive for 
FDI. The transition dummy is significantly negative. Transition countries could be at a 
disadvantage vis-à-vis Western Europe as they have opened to FDI relatively recently, 
implying lower agglomeration and knowledge transmission effects.  
  The specifications in column (1)-(4) use various governance indices as regressors.  
Column (1) uses the Property_Rights index; column (2) uses the Governance_KKZ 
index; column (3) uses the GCR_WDR index; and column (4) uses the German_Exporter 
index. For the first two indices, as the value of the index increases, governance becomes 
better. The opposite is true for the last two indices. It follows from Table 2 that improved 
governance in host country increases a firm’s incentive to undertake FDI in that country.  
  To test if governance affects foreign investors differently, in the last 8 columns 
we interact the host country’s governance measures with the size of the foreign investor. 
In column (5), host country Property_Rights index is interacted with the size of foreign 
investor. The interaction term is significantly negative at 1%, implying that larger foreign 
investors are less sensitive to host country’s Property_Rights protection. In Column (6) 
the Governance_KKZ index is interacted with foreign investor’s size. It is significant at 
1%. In Columns (7) and (8), the GCR_WDR and German_Exporter indices are used. 
Both interaction terms are significant at 1%.  
  To increase the number of transition countries, columns (9)-(12) drop the 
FDI_Restrictions index. The results indicate that our previous findings are robust to 
increasing the number of countries in the dataset. 
As another robustness check, not presented here to save space, we focused on 
explaining the determinants of FDI volume rather than the decision to invest. The results   6
confirm our previous findings that smaller foreign investors are more sensitive to host 




The existing empirical literature on determinants of FDI has paid little attention to 
the impact of host country’s institutional quality on foreign investors of various sizes. 
Smaller investors may be more sensitive to property rights protection and/or corruption as 
they have lower bargaining power and undertake more innovative activity. Our results 
support the hypothesis that poor governance in host countries has a larger deterrent effect 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics 
 
 
Variable   Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
         
Host country population (log)  81420  16.679  1.071  15.138  18.800 
FDI_Restrictions 81420  1.478  1.74  0  4 
Tax _Rate  81420  32.89  7.11  18  51 
         
 
Property _Rights  81420  5.33  1.20  2.4  6.5 
Governance_KKZ 81240  1.35  1.11  -0.89  2.58 
GCR_WDR 81240  2.93  1.36  1.3  5.5 
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Table 2. Fixed Effect Logit            
  Columns (1)-(4):  Columns (5)-(12): 
  No Interaction Term  With Interaction Term 
  (1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
Population  1.136***  1.241***  1.223*** 1.241*** 1.131*** 1.235*** 1.225*** 1.238*** 1.187*** 1.354*** 1.294*** 1.295*** 
[0.017]  [0.019]  [0.018] [0.018] [0.017] [0.019] [0.018] [0.018] [0.017] [0.018] [0.017] [0.017] 
FDI_Restrictions  -0.483***  -0.350***  -0.374*** -0.448*** -0.482*** -0.347*** -0.372*** -0.446***        
  [0.016]  [0.019]  [0.018] [0.016] [0.016] [0.019] [0.018] [0.016]        
Tax_Rate  -0.103***  -0.094***  -0.073*** -0.091*** -0.104*** -0.094*** -0.073*** -0.091*** -0.119*** -0.082*** -0.069*** -0.093*** 
[0.002]  [0.002]  [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.003] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] 
Transition_Dummy  -1.503***  -0.917***  -1.120*** -1.564*** -1.517*** -0.922*** -1.130*** -1.577*** -1.151*** -0.406*** -0.779*** -1.615*** 
[0.063]  [0.077]  [0.070] [0.062] [0.064] [0.079] [0.070] [0.062] [0.060] [0.070] [0.064] [0.055] 
Property_Rights  0.736***      1.441***     1.672***     
  [0.025]      [0.116]     [0.109]     
Governance_KKZ      0.555***     1.068***     1.414***    
  [0.037]     [0.115]     [0.101]    
GCR_WDR      -0.647***     -0.861***     -1.216***   
    [0.024]     [0.085]     [0.081]   
German_Exporter     -0.252***     -0.448***     -0.589*** 
       [0.009]     [0.040]     [0.039] 
                
Property_Rights  *  Size      -0.098***     -0.089***     
        [0.016]     [0.015]     
Governance_KKZ  *  Size         -0.075***     -0.025*    
       [0.017]     [0.013]    
GCR_WDR  *  Size          0.030***      0.038***  
        [0.012]      [0.011]  
German_Exporter  *  Size         0.027***     0.032*** 
           [0.005]     [0.005] 
Observations  81420  81420  81420 81420 81420 81420 81420 81420 95688 95688 95688 95688 






      
 